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HUMAnItY
René ten Bos
The philosophical city knows of only one evil. Sophistry is its name. 
It is embodied by certain parvenu-like and invariably well-dressed 
people who earn a living by teaching the younger inhabitants of the 
city lessons about wisdom and beautiful speech. Sophists make a lot 
of money. Protagoras of Abdera, the first philosopher identified as a 
sophist, is reputed to charge a fee of roughly 100 minae which would 
now amount to about 150,000 American dollars. It is true, a course 
by Protagoras can take more than a year, but it is by any standard 
a guruesque fee. In terms of rewards, the organization of sophistry 
can certainly be seen as a predecessor of the contemporary business 
school. 
Plato, poor Plato, hates anything that is fashionable and is at pains to 
combat the evil of sophistry. He argues that sophists are immersed in a 
web of lies: they are mixers, artisans, technicians, or manufacturers of 
untruth. Nowadays, we read the same stuff about management gurus 
and about business schools. Not everything that Plato says, however, 
would resonate with contemporary criticisms of business schools. 
Sophists, he argues must violate the worthiness of philosophy because 
they have worked with their bodies. Before they become sophists, they 
were porters, wrestlers, in short, people who used their filthy bodies. 
That is surely something that can neither be said of managers nor of 
business schools. It should come as no surprise that Plato’s book about 
the republic has oftentimes been interpreted as the first handbook for 
management. 
Plato’s complaints about the artisans of words are particularly sordid: 
he speaks about dwarfish people with vulgar occupations that cannot 
but mutilate the soul. The sophist is, according to Plato, a workman 
who gave up work but who has in no way been able to ward off the 
physical and mental deformities that is its inevitable result. Rich he 
may be, but he continues to be dwarfish, mutilated, and vulgar. This 
is, of course, what only a real philosopher (such as Plato himself or 
Socrates) is able to see. Evil is always ugly – especially when it is keeping 
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up appearances. Socrates, for that matter, never kept up appearances. 
We know that. Indeed, his shameless ugliness is what made him so 
beautiful. It is better to confront those who are responsible for the 
management of the state with a guy like him than with ugly dwarfs 
who can never lay off their dwarfishness. 
Here is a question that I would like to ask: Is the business school of 
the future a place for ugly dwarfs who have experienced with their 
bodies the all-importance of money or a place for beautiful Platonists 
who feel only disdain for those who need bodies in order to obtain 
money? 
* * *
If we are to believe Plato, sophists are ugly. But did they think or say 
ugly things? Let us go back to Protagoras who is the first and therefore 
the most important of the entire bunch. Unfortunately, nothing of his 
written word survives. But we know from other texts that he spoke 
many beautiful words and one of these words I had to learn by heart 
when I was a student of philosophy: ‘Man is the measure of all things, 
of those which are that they are, and of those which are not, that they 
are not’.
This is what pisses the true Platonist off. According to him, the sophist 
is a harbinger of evil. If  it is true that man is the measure of all things, 
then wisdom or sensible speech will become virtually impossible. 
Nothing  is a thing in itself for it is only a thing for you, for me, or for 
someone else. The same thing, depending on your or my ‘measure’, can 
be light for me or heavy for you. In fact, the very idea of sameness is 
jettisoned by the sophists.  Everything has become relative  and since 
what appears to me now will not necessarily be what appears to you or 
what will appear to me tomorrow, everything has become subject to 
change. And if everything becomes both relative and transient, how 
the hell can the sophist claim that wisdom is still possible? And mind 
you, this is exactly what he claims when he pretends to be teaching. 
What the sophist stands for is evil for his ideas deny the possibility of 
truth and wisdom. And what would life in the city of philosophical 
citizens be if both cannot be attained? 
How does the sophist respond? No, no, you get me wrong, Socrates. 
I do not deny the possibility of wisdom or even its existence. On the 
contrary, I claim that wisdom is available for a man, provided that he 
is able to change the bad things appearing to him into good things. 
Things can be made better, and what I mean by this is not that they 
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can be made more truthful but that they can be made more useful, 
more beneficial, or more healthy. In fact, this is what my musings 
about the human measure are all about. It is simply narrow-minded 
to think of truth as something which is on a par with betterment or 
quality. Things can be better without being truer. Truth, in other words, 
is not a category which is indispensable to the good life. Usefulness 
and health are. Yet, they are not the same to everyone, to any man. 
Anyway, wisdom doesn’t need the bloody truth. 
In a manifesto we should, perhaps, not quote, but ‘shoot from the hip’. 
Well, John Wayne decided to consult some famous political manifestos 
and guess what he did encounter? Right. An awful lot of quotes! He 
even consulted management manifestos (for example, Business Process 
Redesign: A Manifesto for a Business Revolution) and came across a lot 
of highly intelligent and beautiful quotes. To shoot from the hip is 
fine with John, but manifestos should not be stupid (even though they 
can be stupid). It is well known how doubtful Marx and Engels were 
about their particular manifesto: they even added footnotes to it. So, 
I have already inserted a rather short quote and now I will insert a 
rather lengthy one and then I will engage in an awkward albeit brief 
philosophical discussion about this: 
I do know many things which are unbeneficial for men 
– foods and drinks and drugs and countless others – but 
are still beneficial, and some which are neither beneficial 
nor unbeneficial for men, but are beneficial for horses; some 
only for oxen, and others for dogs. And then some which are 
not beneficial to any of these, but are beneficial to trees; and 
some which are good for the roots of the tree, but bad for its 
branches, just as dung is good when it’s laid on the roots of any 
plant, but if you put it on the young branches and shoots, it 
destroys everything. Then, also, oil is utterly bad for all plants 
and is extremely damaging to the hair of all animals except 
man. In fact, it’s actually beneficial to men’s hair, and to the 
rest of the body. And the good is something so varying and 
manifold, that this particular thing is good for men’s bodies, 
externally, while, internally, the very same thing is extremely 
bad.
I do not know what you might think but I love this passage. It is the 
kind of thinking that Plato attributes to Protagoras. I admire the 
subtlety with which  the speaker moves from the human to the animal 
and from the animal to the thing and then from the thing back again 
to the human. Man may be the measure of all things, but it seems 
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that Protagoras adopts a far more radical standpoint: each thing, alive 
and lifeless, is its own measure. If we understand this, then we can 
also understand how easy it is to go from man to animal and from 
animal to things and vice versa. There are only zones of indeterminacy 
between them.
So then, why is this evil? Badiou, contemporary Platonic radical and self-
declared militant and defender of drastic deeds in our pusillanimous 
lives, argues that the sophist’s relativism privileges meaning over 
truth. For a bloke like Gorgias, nothing truly exists, nothing can be 
truly apprehended, and nothing can be truly communicated. Only 
rhetoric, Gorgias claims, reigns supreme. For Badiou, this merely 
opens the door to religion: there is no truth with which to refute the 
zealots of this world. One should bear in mind that religion’s hallmark 
is its perennial search for meaning rather than for truth. Such a search 
– there can be no misunderstanding about this – must  be steeped 
in blood. However, this is something which can only be grasped by 
truly non-religious people and not by those who seek inspiration in 
the work of contemporary sophists such as Nietzsche or Wittgenstein. 
These are, in fact, religious people who think that they know about 
truths whereas they are only consumers and producers of that most 
deadly thing of all: meaning. If Nietzsche, this unthinking idiot, is 
right in claiming that truth is an army of metaphors and metonymies 
and nothing else, then we have skilfully destroyed truth. Yes, 
Nietzsche’s silly and evil agenda is to replace mathematics by poetry. 
As a consequence, we are bogged down in a deadly relativism which 
feeds on the market of meanings and has done in with any concept 
of truth. Only Plato, Descartes, and others who embrace the truth of 
mathematics can save us from this miserable state of affairs. 
* * *
Protagoras is the biggest culprit of all for the relativist misery started 
with him. The best way to counteract this evil tendency is to rephrase 
or rework the infamous quote: ‘Man is the measure of al things …’. You 
proceed in two steps. First, you flatly deny that man is the measure of 
all things. Whatever measure there is, it must lie outside man, in an 
objective realm to which men can only aspire by dint of mathematics 
and philosophy. Second, and this is the truly important step, you turn 
man himself into a thing – and consequently, you will find out that he 
is no longer afflicted by a flux of appearing things but simply relates 
as a mathematically thinking subject to a world of mathematically 
calculable objects. In other words, the subject is the thing and the 
object is just what it is – an object rather than a thing, or at least a thing 
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that does not think. The difference between a thing and an object is 
that the former can, as Protagoras was fully aware, be its own measure 
and that the object is only an object in relation to a subject.
The subject must become a thing in order to escape the endless 
affliction by things of the world. The human being can only be liberated 
if he is rendered immune to animals and things. Protagoras’s zones of 
indeterminacy are not particularly helpful here for they undermine 
this immunity. At the heart of the enlightenment lies the desire to 
replace the world and its things by a world of objects that is navigated 
by a mathematical mind. Descartes refers to this mind as a thinking 
thing, a res cogitans. The world and its objects is the ‘extended thing’, 
the res extensa. The thinking thing, insofar as it is a human rather 
than a divine thinking thing, is not only thinking. It also feels and as a 
feeling thing, not as a thinking thing, it relates to the extended thing. 
Importantly, however, it is not the body that feels but the thinking 
thing, that is, the mind. The body is condemned to such a level of 
passivity that it has almost vanished from the world. It cannot even 
feel, or if it feels, it does so in a confused and obscure rather than a 
clear and orderly way, which is why it is, for a scientist at least, utterly 
irrelevant. Science, Erich Kästner once argued, is what makes the 
world vanish. The archaeologist or the historian of art does not see 
a church but he sees walls, towers, icons, and other remnants from a 
past that is in need of mathematical or scientific clarification. 
* * *
The idea of a thing that thinks and of a non-thinking and extended 
thing is, of course, informed by the idea of a thing that persists: things 
in a Cartesian universe are, unlike things in the sophist’s universe, not 
transient or impermanent. They subsist, they partake in substance. 
The shapes that a piece of wax can take, Descartes famously explains, 
are constantly flexible and changeable so that they are as unreliable 
as sophist chatter. Thing is, as Heidegger taught us, another word for 
reliability . From what I feel and sense, I cannot really figure out of what 
the wax is – it remains unclear and obscure to me, but the mind, my 
mind, the thinking thing that is me and that constitutes my humanity 
should take off the shapes of the wax as if it were clothes in order to 
see it ‘nude’. Only the thinking thing can see the naked truth under 
all appearances which are  deceitful. Where the world of the sophist 
is endlessly wrapped and folded, Descartes offers us a thinking thing 
that stands naked in a naked world. It is this naked thing that has 
come to constitute our view of humanity. Paradoxically, man and not 
beast has become the only naked animal in the world. Its protectors 
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claim that it is its very nudity that elevates the thinking thing from the 
animal kingdom. 
If there is any sophist inspiration, then it is this: a profound desire 
not only to dress up the world of things but also a desire to see this 
world as already dressed, as tissue, as apparel, as something that can 
be endlessly folded. Plato and Badiou think that this is evil and their 
answer to evil is one grand effort to mathematically undress the world. 
This is why they object to poetry, fashion, clothes … But why would we 
not consider the thing as clothing rather than as nudity? In a famous 
passage of the Meditations, Descartes wonders whether there are 
thinking things under the hats and clothes that he sees when he looks 
out of his window. As Perniola pointed out not very long ago, we must 
bring our attention to those hats and clothing rather than to the ghost 
and the machines. 
Human life is a tissue and it takes place within a world that is itself a 
tissue. Not that superb thinkers such as Plato, Descartes, or Badiou 
would agree with this. They think the human being as a naked thing. 
Take Kant, another example of this baleful tendency.  He would 
definitely condemn every effort to reduce the human being to a 
thing, an instrument, or resource, as unethical. No Human Resource 
Management for the famous Prussian! But his own view of the ethical 
subject is very thing-like. At the end of Critique of Practical Reason, 
he wonders what a human being would be if it would abide by the 
moral law. Would it not be an automaton, a puppet in a theatre, an 
automatic duck? In short, in contemplating ethics, Kant finds himself 
with Descartes in a world of automatons and ghosts. How could it 
be else? If the naked truth behind the world of appearances is the 
noumenal thing-in-itself (the thing stripped bare of its appearances), 
then this nakedness can only be apprehended by a naked human thing, 
a thinking thing, a thing without feeling, or a noumenal subject. As 
subject, man is reduced to a thing-in-itself and only as such is he able 
to have other things-in-itself for-itself.
You can rely on the thing. On the thing, there is Verlässichkeit 
(reliability). Man cannot therefore be the measure of things and should 
become a thing in itself: naked rather than clothed, unfolded rather 
than wrapped up, developed rather than undeveloped. The sophist is 
so badly wrong because he thinks man in terms of relations: his truths 
are merely products of what he is and where he is rather than universal 
and absolute truths. 
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The Platonist objects to this view of the world as an all-engulfing 
tissue, where everything is relative, and replaces it by a topological 
nirvana where thinking things, ethical things, ethical automatons, 
and thinking automatons dwell. Things are securely placed beyond 
empiricism, social background and all other dismal instances of 
heteronomy. Now, we have autonomous thinking things capable of 
grasping or experiencing truths that can never be put into perspective. 
Admittedly, you can rely on these automated things, but haven’t they 
left the world of sensible things, the world of animals, the world of 
flowers and trees, the world of perfumes, minerals, and rocks? The price 
to be paid for Verlässichkeit (reliability) is Verlassenheit (solitude).
Since the Renaissance, we have increasingly embraced humanism as 
detached reliability. I take sides with the sophist intervention: we are 
tissue in a world of tissue. We are not naked. We are not isolated. We 
cannot but rely on appearances. We have meaning rather than truth. 
* * *
So, that was quite a lot of philosophical mumbo-jumbo for a manifesto. 
Sorry for that, dear reader. What do I expect the business school of the 
future to be? Expect? I don’t expect nice things to happen there. There 
will only be more strife for reliability, courage, morality and action 
and as a consequence we will see more puppets, more automatons, in 
short, more ‘things’. This is, I suggest, a profoundly stupid thing to do 
in an unreliable world. And it is against this that the sophists already 
warned us. 
We need, Baudrillard once argued, delusional minds in a delusional 
world. We need to understand that wisdom and truth are not natural 
partners. We need more animals, more bodies, more filth. We need 
meaning rather than truth. We need drugs and alcohol rather than 
sobriety. We need sex rather than chastity. We need distortions of 
the truth. We need Leibnizan mathematics rather than Cartesian 
mathematics. We need baroque. We need to understand the clothes 
rather than the ghosts. We need sophistry rather than managerial 
Platonism. And most important of all, we need not feel exasperated 
by all our insolences and should, like the sophist, humbly welcome the 
money that we can earn with this.
It is always better to be an ugly dwarf than a beautiful thing.
